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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are an automotive worker in the Deep South of the
United States. The automobile factory you work at employs thousands of
workers, as is common in the region. The plant is owned by a foreign
manufacturer, which is par for the course as well. You work eight to ten
hours a day and make good wages compared to most people in your state,
although that depends on whether you are a full-time employee or still
employed by the temp agency that contracts with the manufacturer.
At some point during your career, a union drive starts among the
workforce. As it builds in influence, attention is drawn to hazardous
working conditions and broken promises by management. Eventually, the
unionizing effort becomes strong enough to petition for an election to earn
certification as the collective bargaining representative of you and your coworkers. If you have not already pledged support for the union, its
organizers work fervently to win your vote.
At this point, plant management takes on a different tone regarding
the union. Whereas your supervisors may have once been standoffish or at
most annoyed, now they are outwardly hostile at the idea of unionization.
You and dozens of other workers are pulled aside for weekly presentations
that frame your vote as a show of loyalty. Rumors abound that your
cherished benefits will be lost if a union comes into the workplace, and
some even worry that the plant will close its doors and flee town for
cheaper labor.
The bitterness of this battle taking place on your employer’s
doorstep—emulating the final weeks of a presidential campaign in the
closest of swing states—may not be surprising to you, given that the
company is defending its territory. But you soon discover that
management’s message does not stop at the end of your shift. Television
commercials urge you to “Vote No” on unionization. Local business leaders
in the state take to the airwaves to warn of labor’s lies and inefficiencies.
Pro-company signs line the streets and adorn the windows of most of your
town’s small businesses. Pamphlets arrive daily from vaguely named
organizations like “Americans for Prosperity,” rife with statistics that decry
the economic devastation that unions have wrought in northern cities. Most
jarring of all are the press releases from state politicians in the days before
the election that promise new assembly lines in return for the union’s defeat

2020

GRAND THEFT AUTO

101

or threaten job losses in the event of a victory. By the time you are finally
ready to fill out a ballot, it is as if the entire community is demanding that
you maintain the status quo and send the union packing.
These are the conditions described by Robert Hathorn, a service
technician at the Nissan plant in Canton, Mississippi who voted “yes” for
the United Auto Workers (UAW) but saw the union rejected by almost twothirds of his co-workers in August of 2017. Hathorn described the election
environment as “overwhelming” and the anti-union message as
“telepathic”:
I would go to work and get in that shift meeting; a message
comes on the [in-plant] TV about voting no to the UAW.
Then the manager says something, then I go to the break
room and there are slides slandering the UAW. Then you get
ready to leave and they hand out literature about voting
against the union. I leave work and up and down the
highway you see Vote No signs. You see billboards talking
about “our team, our future,” you get home and you get
brochures in the mail, you turn on the television and there it
was again. Every time you turn on social media it’s there. It
was overwhelming. That had to get to people.1
Much of what Hathorn describes is legal within the confines of
American labor law. Employers may require employees to attend anti-union
presentations (innocuously dubbed “captive audience meetings”) during
working hours without affording the union the same access and
opportunity.2 Employers have wide latitude to express their views

1

Chris Brooks, Why Did Nissan Workers Vote No?, LABOR NOTES (August 11, 2017),
http://www.labornotes.org/2017/08/why-did-nissan-workers-vote-no [hereinafter Brooks].
2
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953) (restoring the “no-equalopportunity” rule regarding in-plant captive audience meetings). Employers are granted
near-dictatorial authority in this setting:
The employer is entitled to discipline employees who leave the captive
audience meeting or who insist on participating by asking questions or
manifesting disagreement with the views being force-fed to them.
Further, the employer may prevent pro-union employees from attending
such meetings, deliberately isolating employees from co-workers who
might be able to rebut the employer’s claims. It is not unprecedented for
an employer to lock all the exits at the workplace during a captive
audience meeting and physically restrain those attempting to leave.
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regardless of the medium through which they communicate them, only
contravening the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) if these expressions
contain either a threat of reprisal or force, or a promise of benefit.3
Generally, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency
statutorily charged with enforcing the Act, largely refrains from policing the
veracity of employers’ campaign literature.4 The Board will only set an
election aside on these grounds if the literature amounts to “forged
documents” that “render the voters unable to recognize propaganda for what
it is.”5 Perhaps sensing the soft underbelly of this system, employers have
expanded their utilization of sophisticated union-avoidance tactics in recent
decades to increasingly effective results.6
However, actions undertaken by external forces in organizing drives
lie on shakier ground. Third parties unrelated to the conflict do not possess
the explicit speech rights under the NLRA that employers and workers
enjoy.7 Nonetheless, groups ranging from local citizens to advocacy groups
to sitting politicians choose to offer their views in elections, deemed
important to the given region, routinely engaging in impassioned rhetoric
and prediction-making as to the effects of unionization.8 In a pair of recent
elections that garnered national attention, these intrusions have surpassed
Roger C. Hartley, Freedom Not to Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory
Indoctrination through Workplace Captive Audience Meetings, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 65, 68 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
3
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012).
4
Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (“[W]e will no
longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements, and that we will
not set elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements.”).
5
Id. Perversely, the Midland standard arguably incentivizes union-resistant employers to
position their campaigns as flagrantly coercive as possible so as to avoid portraying their
arguments in a deceptive fashion. See id. (“[W]e will set an election aside not because of
the substance of the representation, but because of the deceptive manner in which it was
made, a manner which renders employees unable to evaluate the forgery for what it is.”).
6
See, e.g., Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer
Opposition to Organizing, E.P.I. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 235 (2009) [hereinafter
Brofenbrenner]. Bronfenbrenner conducted her study from a random sample of 1,004
NLRB certifications and from an in-depth survey of 562 campaigns conducted within that
sample between the years 1999 and 2003. Id. at 1. She found, among other things, that
employers utilized captive-audience meetings in 89 percent of elections, hired
“management consultants” in 75 percent of elections, and distributed anti-union literature
in upwards of 70 percent of elections. Id. at 10, tbl. 3. These tactics greatly reduced the
union’s chances of winning certification. Id.
7
See infra notes 77—98 and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 99—121 and accompanying text.
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the point of conjecture and bordered on threats.9 However, because these
entities technically operate independently from the warring factions, their
behavior has escaped legal scrutiny despite its potential coerciveness on
workers’ freedom of choice.
This article will argue that unions face little hope of prevailing in
these sort of large-scale campaigns until the Board rules that aggressive,
anti-union community pressure violates federal labor law. Part I examines
recent major organizing drives initiated by the United Auto Workers in
which such community pressure has come to bear upon representation
elections, detailing the extent of the meddling and the unique threats the
perpetrators are capable of. Part II introduces case law regarding the
“laboratory conditions” of Board-officiated elections and analyzes existing
protections against third-party interference. Part III argues that these
barriers are wholly inadequate in the modern context of regional anti-union
blitzkriegs, and it proposes that the laboratory conditions doctrine be
interpreted to encompass the type of tactics deployed in the UAW’s recent
defeats if unions are to have any chance at success in large-scale organizing
campaigns going forward. Part IV concludes the Article by evaluating this
suggestion against the backdrop of more drastic proposals to reform
American labor law, concluding that the laboratory conditions doctrine
needs immediate revisal regardless of other approaches.
I. ORGANIZING THE SOUTH: A CRASH COURSE IN PROGRESS
Organized labor in the United States is in an extended state of crisis.
While unions once represented more than a third of American workers, they
now represent barely a tenth of the labor market (and less than seven
percent of the private sector).10 A combination of global market
economics,11 increased employer resistance to unionizing efforts,12 and

9

See infra notes 30—76 and accompanying text.
Megan Dunn & James Walker, Union Membership In The United States, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-theunited-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf.
11
See Robert E. Scott, Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade and Job Displacement After
NAFTA, E.P.I. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 308 1 (2011) (finding that U.S. trade deficits with
Mexico had displaced 682,900 U.S. jobs. as of 2010); see also Stephen Eidle, Rust Belt
Cities and Their Burden of Legacy Costs, MANHATTAN INST. (Oct. 2017),
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-SE-1017.pdf (tabulating the loss
of manufacturing jobs in Rust Belt cities) [hereinafter Eidle].
10
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hostile, anti-union government policy13 have decimated membership rolls
and driven down wages and benefits for union and nonunion workers
alike.14 Pro-union reforms to the NLRA have died in conference or at the
hand of Senate filibusters,15 leaving federal labor law largely unchanged for
over half-a-century.16 Employers have exploited this stagnation through the
increased utilization of automation, subcontractors, and “temporary”
workers, effectively turning technological innovation against those seeking
stable jobs and benefits.17
To survive in the twenty-first century, unions must organize new
members to replace those they have lost to aforementioned factors.
However, vast swaths of the country are essentially walled off from
sustained organizing efforts. Twenty-seven states18 are currently operating
under so-called “Right to Work” laws, which prohibit union security-clause
12

See Bronfenbrener, supra note 6. For an example of an effective corporate assault upon a
union’s bargaining power, see Michael H. Cimini, Caterpillar’s Prolonged Dispute Ends,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS (Fall 1998), available
at https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/caterpillars-prolonged-dispute-ends.pdf (chronicling
Caterpillar’s resounding win at the bargaining able amidst a series of labor disputes with
the UAW between 1991 and 1998); James Surowiecki, Caterpillar’s Crawl to Control,
Slate (Mar. 13, 1998, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/the_motley_fool
/1998/03/caterpillars_crawl_to_control.html. In the spirit of transparency, my grandfather
was a longtime member of UAW Local 974 in Peoria, Illinois, the largest local involved in
the dispute.
13
See, e.g., Gordon Lafer, Attacks on Public-Sector Workers Hurt Working People and
Benefit the Wealthy, ECON. POLICY INST. (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.epi.org/publication
/attacks-on-public-sector-workers-hurt-working-people-and-benefit-the-wealthy/
(highlighting the recent evisceration of collective bargaining rights for public-sector
workers in Iowa and Wisconsin).
14
See Josh Bivens et al., How Today’s Unions Help Working People: Giving Workers the
Power to Improve Their Jobs and Unrig the Economy, ECON. POLICY INST. 7-11 (2017).
15
See Rand Wilson, The Labor Law Reform We Need, LABOR NOTES (July 11, 2012),
http://www.labornotes.org/2012/07/labor-law-reform-we-need.
16
See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527 (2002).
17
Catherine Rampell, The Rise of Part-Time Work, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Mar. 8, 2013,
10:51 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/the-rise-of-part-time-work/;
Noam Scheiber, Plugging Into the Gig Economy, From Home With a Headset, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/business/economy/call-center-gigworkers.html.
18
Missouri’s voters overturned their state’s Right to Work law in a state-wide ballot
referendum in August of 2018 after turning in triple the amount of signatures necessary to
enact the constitutional blocking mechanism. Noam Schreiber, Missouri Voters Reject
Anti-Union Law in a Victory for Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/08/07/business/economy/missouri-labor-right-to-work.html. Missouri was set to
otherwise become the twenty-eighth Right-to-Work state in the union.
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provisions that enable unions to collect “fair share fees” to cover the costs
of services and representation. These laws, made possible through one of
the Taft-Hartley Act’s amendments,19 create an incentive for workers to
decline paying union dues and become “free riders” of services tied to
representation. Unions are required by law to represent all employees in the
bargaining unit equally,20 thus potentially wasting resources on workers
who do not pay the organization a cent in return.
But this assumes a union is even extant. The southern states, which
almost uniformly passed Right-to-Work laws in the first decade of their
legality, are home to most of the lowest union-density rates in the country.21
A concomitance of (often circular) economic and social factors lead to
employer hegemony in the Deep South, including fiscal austerity,
underinvestment in education, and conservative social policies.22 In light of
the post-war labor movement’s devastating failure to organize multi-racial
unions amidst a cacophony of race- and red-baiting business tactics, some
have dubbed the South’s implacable opposition to labor and minority rights
“the Southern cage.”23
As such, it may seem counter-intuitive that today’s unions would
waste a substantial amount of resources attempting to organize southern
workplaces. However, if unions are to increase membership and regain
leverage in collective bargaining, there simply is no avoiding the fastest
growing region in the country.24 Perpetuating the “race to the bottom”
19

Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012).
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012); accord Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
21
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by
State, U.S. DEP’T LABOR (displaying union-density rates as 2015-16 annual averages)
[hereinafter Union Density].
22
See Colin Gordon, The Legacy of Taft-Hartley, JACOBIN (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://jacobinmag.com/2017/12/taft-hartley-unions-right-to-work; Ross Eisenbrey, RightTo-Work Laws: Designed to Hurt Unions and Lower Wages, E.P.I. (Mar. 2, 2015, 3:45
PM),
http://www.epi.org/blog/right-to-work-laws-designed-to-hurt-unions-and-lowerwages/.
23
See Rich Yeselson, Fortress Unionism, DEMOCRACY JOURNAL (Summer 2013),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/29/fortress-unionism/ [hereinafter Yeselson]; see
also Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the
New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (2005),
available at http://havenscenter.org/files/southern_imposition.pdf.
24
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Clock, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, available at
https://www.census.gov/popclock/data_tables.php?component=growth (last visited Nov.
14, 2017).
20
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socio-economic phenomenon, both domestic and foreign employers have
increasingly located their manufacturing operations in the low-wage,
regulatory lax South rather than compete with the higher wage and more
union-populous northern state economies.25
Capital is fleeing from unions, and unions have no choice but to
pursue it—even if the path is treacherous and the chance of success is slim.
Furthermore, organized labor cannot afford to bide time and fortify its
position in its northern and Midwestern bases, as even former strongholds
like Michigan and Wisconsin have passed Right-to-Work legislation under
recent Republican insurgencies.26 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the
UAW—one of the unions hardest hit by the global recession and its effect
upon heavily-organized industries such as auto-manufacturing27—has made
it a top priority to unionize foreign automakers in the South.28
A.

Volkswagen Chattanooga

The UAW’s first major target in its southward push was the 1,400acre, 3,000-plus employee Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee.29
The plant, which started production in 2011 and represents a one-billiondollar investment by the German automaker,30 was always “the most

25

See generally NORMAN CAULFIELD, NAFTA AND LABOR IN NORTH AMERICA (2011); see
also Chris Brooks, Money for Nothing, JACOBIN (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/vw-subsidies-chattanooga-tn-uaw-autoworkers. Of
course, the phenomenon of “capital flight” has existed before modern labor law even came
to be. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance:
Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEX. L. REV. 921, 969-70 (1993).
26
Monica Davey, Unions Suffer Latest Defeat in Midwest With Signing of Wisconsin
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/us/gov-scottwalker-of-wisconsin-signs-right-to-work-bill.html. Moreover, manufacturing jobs continue
to disappear in private-sector unions’ remaining bastions of strength. See Eidle, supra note
11.
27
U.A.W. and the Auto Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2015/10/08/business/uaw-auto-union-timeline.html#/#time386_11115 (stating
that in 2008 UAW membership dropped below 500,000 members for the first time since
1941, down from a peak of 1.5 million members in 1979).
28
See Nick Bunkley, U.A.W. to Renew Organizing Efforts at Foreign-Owned Plants, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/business/global/13uaw.html
(noting the UAW’s plan to portray resisting companies as “human rights violators”).
29
Chattanooga, VOLKSWAGEN: GROUP OF AMERICA, http://www.volkswagengroup
america.com/facts.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
30
Id.
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promising prospect” from the union’s perspective.31 Volkswagen was
known for its uniquely collaborative relationship with Germany’s largest
trade union, IG Metall, manifested in the form of industry-wide bargaining
and subsidiary works councils.32 These councils are elected bodies of
employee representatives that supplement an employer’s union but also
function independently from the adversarial model of collective
bargaining.33 The German principle of “codetermination” stipulates that
employers must obtain approval from employees before making certain
decisions for the business,34 whereby works councils may exercise
consenting authority over anything from bonuses to working hours to
vacation days.35 Such a social partnership is unprecedented in the United
States, and IG Metall provided substantial advice and support to the UAW
throughout the organizing process.36 Meanwhile, Volkswagen management
expressed interest in importing German-styled works councils to
Chattanooga by way of unionization.37

31

Stephen J. Silvia, The United Auto Workers’ Attempts to Unionize Volkswagen
Chattanooga, I.L.R. REVIEW 4 (2017) [hereinafter Silvia].
32
Id. at 4-5.
33
Id at 5.
34
Allison Drutchas, An American Works Council: Why It’s Time to Repeal NLRA Section
8(a)(2), 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 29, 39 (2016).
35
Id. at 42 (citations omitted). Further, German works councils have notification rights to
the company’s financial affairs and its decision to terminate a worker’s employment, as
well as consultation rights to the implementation of new technology in the workplace. Id. at
43.
36
Silvia, supra note 31, at 5-6. As Silvia notes, “IG Metall leaders had become
increasingly concerned that German automakers were diverting production to the United
States to take advantage of the lower labor costs,” and eventually launched a transnational
partnership to attempt to reduce the wage disparity. Id. at 5; see also Ryan Breene, UAW
partners with Germany’s IG Metall to push for better U.S. wages, union representation,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/
20151119/OEM01/151119780/uaw-partners-with-germanys-ig-metall-to-push-for-betteru.s.-wages.
37
Silvia, supra note 31, at 7. The only way to install a works council-type system under
American labor law is through a unionized workplace. Id. at 6-7. In Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), the Board invalidated a set of Japanese-inspired employee
“Action Committees” at a non-union plant because they were unlawfully “dealing with” the
employer over items like wages and working conditions and depended on the company for
financial support in violation of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which declares it ‘‘an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.’’ However, the
Board’s opinion suggested that these “quality circle” employee-participation groups are
permissible if ratified through collective agreement:
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Suffice it to say, the UAW was confident in its efforts. The union
claimed in August of 2013 that a majority of employees in the plant had
signed authorization cards.38 In January of 2014, UAW officials announced
it had reached an agreement with management to hold a Board-supervised
election for recognition from February 12 to 14, and the two sides signed an
official neutrality agreement just weeks before the vote.39 The agreement
was described as a “dream world” for the union.40 Volkswagen agreed to
refrain from engaging in the sort of anti-union campaigning now custom for
American companies, and it provided UAW organizers with a list of names
and home addresses of its employees.41 Additionally, Volkswagen granted
the UAW access to its plant for voluntary gatherings and presentations
before the election while endorsing the German model of works councils
and employee codetermination rights as the plant’s desired model of labor
relations.42 In return, the UAW promised that, if elected, initial collective
bargaining negotiations with Volkswagen would revolve around
“maintaining the highest standards of quality and productivity” and
“maintaining and where possible enhancing the cost advantages and other
competitive advantages that [Volkswagen] enjoys relative to its competitors
. . . .”43
The neutrality agreement produced an incredible wave of backlash
among anti-union forces in the area, which were already loudly outspoken
against the UAW’s organizing efforts at the Chattanooga plant and had
Where there is a labor union on the scene, these employee-management
cooperative programs may act as a complement to the union. They can
not, however, lawfully usurp the traditional role of the Union in
representing the employees in collective bargaining about grievances,
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of work.
Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1004 (Oviatt, Member, concurring); see also Dennis M.
Devaney, Electromation and Du Pont: The Next Generation, 4 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 3, 11-12 (1994). Thus, it is little wonder that Volkswagen and the UAW conditioned
the implementation of works councils in the plant on the election of the UAW as the
employees’ collective bargaining representative. See infra note 41.
38
Silvia, supra note 31, at 9.
39
Id. at 10.
40
Brent Snavely, VW, UAW cooperate before election begins, USA TODAY (Feb. 11, 2014,
7:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/02/11/volkswagen-uawcooperation-vote/5404223/.
41
Silvia, supra note 31, at 11. However, the union agreed to forego from making any house
calls. Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 12.
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persuaded Volkswagen to resist the union’s request for voluntary
recognition.44 Grover Norquist’s lobbying organization, Americans for Tax
Reform, rented a dozen billboards in Chattanooga that visually linked the
UAW to President Barack Obama and abandoned factories in Detroit.45
Local papers quoted sources that speculated unionization would prevent the
plant from obtaining new products for its assembly lines.46 Two prominent
Tennessee State Republicans, Speaker Pro Tempore Bo Watson and House
Majority Leader Gerald McCormick, threatened to withhold future state
subsidies from Volkswagen if its workers voted to unionize.47 A spokesman
for Republican Governor Bill Haslam stated on the eve of the election that it
would “become more difficult for Tennessee to recruit new manufacturers
to the state if the Volkswagen workers are represented by the UAW,”48 and
urged the workers to vote no on behalf of the governor’s office.
Most alarming were the actions of United States Senator Bob
Corker, the former Mayor of Chattanooga. On the first day of voting,
Corker released the following statement at his local office: “I’ve had
conversations today and based on those am assured that should the workers
vote against the UAW, Volkswagen will announce in the coming weeks that
it will manufacture its new mid-size SUV here in Chattanooga.”49
Volkswagen management immediately denied any connection between the
44

Id. at 9; Gabe Nelson, 4 Key VW Decisions Shaped Vote’s Course, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS
(Feb. 22, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20140222/OEM01
/302249972/4-key-vw-decisions-shaped-votes-course
(stating
that
Volkswagen
management refused card-check recognition because it was “concerned about antagonizing
Republican politicians in Tennessee”). Around this time in 2013, the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation had begun offering free legal assistance to Volkswagen
employees “who felt intimidated by UAW organizers”, and right-wing lobbying
organizations—including the Competitive Enterprise Institute and Grover Norquist’s
Americans for Tax Reform—were carpeting the city with anti-union media. Silvia, supra
note 31, at 8.
45
Silvia, supra note 31, at 13.
46
Id. Don Jackson, the recently-retired president of manufacturing at the Chattanooga
plant, stated that he didn’t “know that for a fact, but it’s just economics” that the union
“will not be good” for attracting a new sports utility vehicle line. Mike Pare, Pro-, antiUAW activity gears up ahead of VW election, TIMES FREE PRESS (Feb. 8, 2014),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2014/feb/09/pro-anti-uaw-activity-gearsup-ahead-of-vw/131300/.
47
Silvia, supra note 31, at 14.
48
Brent Snavely, Tenn. Lawmakers Issue Incentive Threat in VW Union Move, USA
TODAY (Feb. 11, 2014, 8:50 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/
2014/02/11/tennessee-volkswagen-uaw-incentives-threat/5388341/.
49
Silvia, supra note 31, at 14.
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outcome of the election and production-related decisions, but Corker
reiterated his claim about future investment the following day: “After all
these years and my involvement with Volkswagen, I would not have made
the statement I made yesterday without being confident it was true and
factual.”50 Corker’s statements immediately received widespread
coverage,51 and even prompted a response from Obama before voting had
officially concluded.52
On the evening of February 14, 2014, the results of the election were
announced. With eighty-nine percent of employees participating, 712 voted
against union representation and 626 voted in favor. The UAW had
garnered forty-seven percent of the vote—shy of the fiftypercent-plus-one
necessary to constitute a majority. “I’m thrilled for the employees and
thrilled for our community,” Corker told the Wall Street Journal that night.
“I’m sincerely overwhelmed.”53
On February 21, 2014, the UAW filed objections with the Board,
alleging coercive third-party interference with the election and urging the
Board to set aside the results and conduct another secret-ballot election.54
The union claimed that Tennessee politicians and private groups repeatedly
50

Id. at 14-15.
See, e.g., Bernie Woodall, U.S. Senator Drops Bombshell During VW Plant Union Vote,
REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2014, 9:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagencorker/u-s-senator-drops-bombshell-during-vw-plant-union-voteidUSBREA1C04H20140213.
52
Ed O’Keefe, Obama Knocks GOP for Fighting Unionization of Tenn. VW Employees,
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/
2014/02/14/obama-knocks-gop-for-fighting-unionization-of-tenn-vw-employees/?utm_
term=.2b4b12740049. Corker had a confrontational history with organized labor in the
state prior to his involvement with the UAW’s campaign at Volkswagen, having been
accused of opposing the Obama’s administration’s American auto-industry bailout on the
basis that he wanted to break the union’s grip on General Motors in Tennessee and
elsewhere. See Peter Whoriskey, Anger Grips Auto Workers, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/12/12/AR2008121204128.html; Zaid Jilani, Corker Booed By Workers At GM
Plant Ceremony, Takes Credit For Saving Industry That He Opposed Saving,
THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 20, 2010, 2:57 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/corker-booed-byworkers-at-gm-plant-ceremony-takes-credit-for-saving-industry-that-he-opposed-saving2efc89229b9a/.
53
Neal E. Boudette, Union Suffers Big Loss at Tennessee VW Plant, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15,
2014, 11:49 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/union-vote-at-volkswagen-tennesseeplant-heading-to-close-1392379887.
54
See Volkswagen Grp. of Am. Inc. and UAW, N.L.R.B., No. 10-RM-121704, UAW
objections filed Feb. 21, 2014, available at http://op.bna.com.s3.amazonaws.com/
dlrcases.nsf/r%3FOpen%3dbpen-9gjt8l [hereinafter UAW Objections].
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threatened the “diminishment of job security if the workers vote for the
union” until their message “was known to every potential voter in this
extremely high visibility campaign.”55 But two months later, the UAW
abruptly announced that it had dropped the charges.56 Most assumed that,
given the union’s narrow loss, it wished to hold another representation as
soon as possible rather than bog the plant down in appeals,57 but it was later
revealed that Volkswagen and the UAW had reached a deal behind the
scenes. The union agreed to forego any elections in Chattanooga for the
next two years, while Volkswagen would recognize the UAW on a
voluntary “members union” basis.58 However, management later reneged on
this agreement after the UAW successfully organized a smaller unit of 164
skilled employees in the plant against Volkswagen’s wishes.59
B.

Nissan Canton

The UAW next set its sights on the sprawling, mile-long Nissan
plant in Canton, Mississippi that housed over 3,500 hourly workers.60 While
still smarting from its loss at Volkswagen, Nissan presented the UAW with
an opportunity to revise its southern organizing strategy. One of the major
criticisms that emerged from the Chattanooga campaign was that the union

55

Id. at 11.
Steven Greenhouse, U.A.W. Drops Appeal of VW Vote in Tennessee, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/auto-workers-union-dropsappeal-in-vw-vote.html.
57
See id. (“[I]f a labor board process included federal court appeals, it could have taken
two years for an N.L.R.B. decision ordering a new election to take effect.”). Under the
NLRA, losing unions must wait twelve months to conduct another election. National Labor
Relations Act § 9(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (2012).
58
UAW Says Volkswagen Reneged on Deal to Recognize Union, TIMES FREE PRESS (June
21, 2016), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2016/jun/21/
uaw-says-volkswagen-reneged-deal-recognize-union/372126/.
59
See id.; see also Silvia, supra note 31, at 16-23. The UAW finally petitioned for another
NLRB election at Volkswagen’s Chattanooga plant in April 2019, narrowly losing 833776. Chris Brooks, Why the UAW Lost Again in Chattanooga, LABOR NOTES (June 14,
2019), https://labornotes.org/2019/06/why-uaw-lost-again-chattanooga. While many
elements of coercive community pressure were present in this sequel election, such as
Tennessee Governor Bill Lee’s decisive anti-union efforts, Volkswagen management was
this time actively opposed to the UAW’s organizing efforts and campaigned stridently
against unionization of the plant. Id. Any legal analysis of the 2019 campaign thus falls
outside the scope of this Article.
60
Noam Scheiber, Racially Charged Nissan Vote Is a Test for U.A.W. in the South, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/business/economy/nissanunited-auto-workers-mississippi.html [herinafter Scheiber].
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failed to engage with the local community and mobilize “civil rights,
church-based, or other civil society groups” until days before the election.61
In Canton, the UAW made sure to cultivate support from the region’s faith
leaders and NAACP officials well before the vote while directing its
messaging campaign—“Worker Rights are Civil Rights”—at Nissan’s
majority African-American workforce.62
Unlike the situation at Volkswagen, Nissan management
vociferously opposed unionization. Whereas Volkswagen negotiated away
its right to campaign against the union leading up to the representation
election, Nissan took full advantage of the bevy of anti-union strategies
afforded it under federal labor law.63 In addition to the usual tactics, rumors
swirled that the company would take away its leased-car benefits that
allowed workers to drive Nissan vehicles at below-market rates with no
credit application.64 And in a pair of unfair labor practice charges filed with
the Board, the UAW accused Nissan officials of telling workers that the
plant would shut down if they voted in favor of unionization,65 as well as
surveilling its employees by rating them in degrees of pro-union
sentiment.66
But management was only one prong of what labor writer Chris
Brooks has deemed the South’s “anti-union trifecta,” which includes the
company itself, business advocacy groups, and the local political
establishment.67 “Vote No” signs appeared in the windows and on the lawns
of most of Canton’s businesses.68 The Mississippi Chamber of Commerce
and the National Association of Manufacturers saturated television channels
61

Silvia, supra note 31, at 16.
See Scheiber, supra note 61; Brooks, supra note 1.
63
See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text; Brooks, supra note 1.
64
Brooks, supra note 1.
65
Id.
66
Josh Eidelson, Union Says Nissan Surveils Workers at Mississippi Plant, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 29, 2017, 3:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-29/uawalleges-nissan-surveils-workers-at-plant-where-union-failed.
67
See Brooks, supra note 1; Labor’s Southern Strategy: A Conversation Between Chris
Brooks and Gene Bruskin, DOLLARS & SENSE (September/October 2017),
http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2017/0917brooks-bruskin.html [hereinafter Brooks &
Bruskin].
68
See Dave Jamieson, United Auto Workers Lose Crucial Union Battle at Mississippi
Nissan Plant, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2017, 12:42 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/uaw-nissan-vote-uaw-rejected_us [hereinafter Jamieson]; see also Mike Elk
(@MikeElk), TWITTER (Aug. 2, 2017, 8:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MikeElk/status/
892905275631562753.
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with anti-union ads.69 Americans for Prosperity—a conservative 501(c)(4)
organization funded by Charles and David H. Koch—stuffed mailboxes
with 25,000 pamphlets that promised economic ruin should the UAW
prevail in the election.70 Republican Governor Phil Bryant was even more
explicit, posting a picture on his official Facebook account depicting
crumbling urban buildings accompanied with the following message: “I
hope the employees at Nissan Canton understand what the UAW will do to
your factory and town. Just ask Detroit. Vote no on the union.”71 Most
appallingly, a local radio station aired an interview with an unidentified
man who proclaimed that Nissan workers would return to “hauling corn and
picking cotton and ploughing fields or digging ditches” should the UAW
force the Japanese automaker out of Mississippi.72
When the dust settled, the UAW had suffered another major loss in a
Board-officiated election, this one more lopsided than at Volkswagen: 2,244
votes against unionization to 1,307 in favor. The union filed unfair labor
practice charges with the Board against Nissan in protest of its more
flagrant labor violations,73 but the trifecta’s overall campaign strategy
remains undefeated in large-scale, media-intensive elections.74 Moreover,
the tumultuous atmosphere of a hotly-contested organizing campaign has
69

Brooks, supra note 1.
Id.
71
Jamieson, supra note 69.
72
Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Nissan: Mississippi Radio Warns Workers They’ll Go Back to
‘Picking Cotton’ If They Unionise as Plant Rejects UAW in Vote, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 5,
2017, 5:19 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/nissan-mississippiradio-workers-picking-cotton-unionise-uaw-reject-vote-a7878236.html.
73
See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
74
In the other major southern organizing effort conducted in recent years, the International
Association of Machinists union suffered a blowout election loss at Boeing’s Charleston,
South Carolina plant under conditions strikingly similar to what the UAW faced against
Nissan. See Chris Brooks, It’s Not Over, JACOBIN (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/boeing-south-carolina-union-machinists-labororganize-uaw-chatanooga-volkswagen (“Boeing and a statewide business advocacy group
saturated local television, radio, newspapers, and social media with hundreds of anti-union
ads.”) [hereinafter It’s Not Over]; see also Josh Eidelson, Boeing’s Best Union Buster Is
South Carolina’s Governor Nikki Haley, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2015, 10:45 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-17/nikki-haley-proud-union-buster-atboeing-south-carolina-i8lpjuao (drawing parallels between Haley’s anti-union efforts on
behalf of Boeing and those of Corker against the UAW). For an extreme example of the
anti-union culture in South Carolina, see Steven Greenhouse, How Do You Drive Out a
Union? South Carolina Factory Provides a Textbook Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/14/us/how-do-you-drive-out-a-union-south-carolinafactory-provides-a-textbook.html?mtrref=www.google.com.
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the added effect of driving exhausted workers to vote for a sense of
normalcy. As Nissan worker and UAW supporter Robert Hathorn stated in
an interview shortly after the election:
“I heard people say ‘I’ll be glad when this is over.’ You
know, they’re tired with it. . . . If I was in [a neutral voter’s]
shoes, I probably would’ve said the same thing. . . . because
it was every single day. . . . It’s like a song you can’t get out
of your head.”75
II. BYPASSING SECTION 8(A)(1) THROUGH THIRD-PARTY INTERFERENCE
A.

The “Laboratory Conditions” Doctrine

It is well understood in industry relations that threats to workers’ job
security—even veiled ones—may substantially impair employees’
autonomy in the workplace. Judge Learned Hand once articulated this
concept in eloquent fashion:
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only
a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of
each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take
their purport from the setting in which they are used of
which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is
perhaps the most important part. What to an outsider will be
no more than the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an
employee may be the manifestation of a determination which
it is not safe to thwart.76
Labor law contemplates this dilemma. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
deems it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights” to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection.77 Policing an employer’s curtailment
of his or her employees’ rights to union organizing remains a constant
imperative of the Board, but it views the build-up to a representation
election as an especially vulnerable time. This added layer of protection first

75

Payday Report, Q&A Robert Hathorn: Nissan workers’ regrets and the fight back.,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jWqmsyFPGk.
76
NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (emphasis added).
77
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
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took form in the landmark case of General Shoe Corp.,78 where the Board
held that it possessed the power to set aside the results of an election and
order a new one even in cases where an unfair labor practice was not
committed. The majority grounded its decision in enforcing employees’
freedom of choice pursuant to the Board’s authority under Section 9 of the
Act:
Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders
improbable a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating
an election, even though that conduct may not constitute an
unfair labor practice. An election can serve its true purpose
only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to
register a free and untrammeled choice for or against a
bargaining representative.
…
In election proceedings, it is the Board’s function to provide
a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the
uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to
establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine
whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the extreme case,
the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of
others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and
the experiment must be conducted over again.79
Thus, if the conditions of the experiment are upset by conduct that is
“calculated to prevent a free and untrammeled choice by the employees” to
the point where they may no longer freely express their desires to vote for
or against unionization, the Board must nullify the results of the election
and conduct another one.80

78

General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
Id. at 126-27.
80
Id. at 126. The Board acknowledged that elections did “not occur in a laboratory where
controlled or artificial conditions may be established,” and that, accordingly, the Board’s
goal was “to establish ideal conditions insofar as possible,” and to assess “the actual facts
in the light of realistic standards of human conduct.” Midland National Life Insurance Co.,
263 N.L.R.B. 127, 130 (1982) (quoting The Liberal Market, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481, 1482
(1954)).
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The Board thereafter set aside elections where employer conduct
“impaired the free and informed atmosphere requisite to an untrammeled
expression of choice by its employees,”81 which included deceptive
campaign propaganda in the form of fraud or forgery,82 indirect threats of
the loss of jobs or benefits,83 threats of physical violence and retaliation,84
and inflammatory racial appeals.85
As an ancillary matter, it is worth mentioning that at least some
scholarship has taken issue with the laboratory conditions doctrine’s tension
with Section 8(c) of the NLRA.86 That section—included in the TaftHartley amendments as a response to the New Deal-era Board’s perceived
transgression of employers’ inherent speech rights87—instructs that an
employer’s expression or dissemination of his or her “views, arguments, or
opinion” does not constitute an unfair labor practice so long as it “contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”88 The General Shoe
81

The Timken-Detroit Axle Company, 98 N.L.R.B. 790, 792 (1952).
See, e.g., id.; United Aircraft Corporation, 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). But see supra notes
5-6 and accompanying text.
83
See., e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962) (overruling cases
upholding “implied threats couched in the guise of statements of legal position” as
privileged under § 8(c)).
84
RJR Archer, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 335 (1985).
85
Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
86
See Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions
Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002) [hereinafter Larsen-Bright]; James W. Wimberly,
Jr. & Martin H. Steckel, NLRB Campaign Laboratory Conditions Doctrine and Free
Speech Revisited, 32 MERC. L. REV. 535 (1981). While much has been written about the
balancing of labor-related speech rights in the workplace, these appear to be the only
academic pieces that examine the laboratory conditions doctrine at article-length. Cf. Derek
C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 45 (1964) (criticizing the doctrine as
vague and intangible); Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of
Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
753, 793-97 (1994) (criticizing the doctrine’s reliance on the “marketplace of ideas”
justification and proposing its replacement with an “ideal of egalitarian deliberation” that
“neutralize[s] the effect of relations of power and subordination on deliberative procedure
and outcomes”); Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 313, 323-28 (2012) (echoing much of Barenberg’s critique). However, Craig
Becker—then-law professor and now-General Counsel of the AFL-CIO—tackled the
doctrine in his intellectual tour de force on employer participation in union representation
elections and noted the same tension from labor’s perspective. Craig Becker, Democracy in
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV.
495, 548-61, 569-70 (1993) [hereinafter Becker].
87
See Larsen-Bright, supra note 86, at 215 nn. 55-59; Becker, supra note 86, at 535-47.
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Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012).
82

2020

GRAND THEFT AUTO

117

case, which empowers the Board to regulate employers’ speech even
without a finding of an unfair labor practice under Section 8, arguably
circumvents the Taft-Harley Congress’s intent to shield employers from the
Board’s expansive reading of employee protections in the context of a
representation election. However, the doctrine to this point has not been
seriously questioned by reviewing judges or subsequent Board personnel,89
and the matter of employer activity falls outside the scope of this Article.
B.

The Board’s Treatment of Third-Party Interference

More interesting for our purposes is the laboratory conditions
doctrine’s application to interference by third parties—that is, persons or
organizations not directly affiliated with the statutory parties to the election.
The Board’s standard for reviewing third-party misconduct has changed
with revisions to federal labor law and adapted to unique fact patterns, but
the Board has generally sought to corral flagrantly anti-union behavior since
its inception.
1.

The Board’s Original Approach Under the Wagner Act
(1935–47)

Not long after its formation, the Board addressed head-on the issue
of “community pressure” against union organizing.90 In the original NLRA,
known colloquially as the Wagner Act for its lead proponent, New York
Senator Robert F. Wagner, Section 2(2) stated that an “employer” was “any
person acting in the interest of the employer, directly or indirectly . . .”91
The original Roosevelt-appointed Board members adopted a broad
interpretation of “employer.” Where it was found that members of the
community consciously instigated adverse public feeling toward the union
and its organizing efforts, the employer was held responsible for violating

89

See Larsen-Bright, supra note 86, at 217-22. The General Shoe case was briefly
controversial in partisan politics, earning immediate criticism and condemnation from the
Taft-Hartley Congress. JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S.
LABOR RELATIONS POLICY 35-36, 50 (1995). However, legislative attempts to overturn the
policy or persuade the Board to abandon it have never come to fruition.
90
See Thomas Wade Phillips, Note, An Analysis of Third Party Community Pressures and
Their Effect upon Union Organizational Activities, 22 VAND. L. REV. 322, 323-28 (1969)
[hereinafter Phillips].
91
Id. at 323.
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Section 8(1) of the Act,92 even if such action was only the creating or
fostering of a sentiment that the employer's plant would be moved if it were
unionized.93
In reaction to this expansive reading of Section 2(2), as well as to
broader concerns about the Board’s disregard of employers’ speech rights,94
Congress amended the section in 1947 to state: “The term ‘employer’
includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly
. . . .”95 Thus, the Board could no longer find unfair labor practices against
employers for anti-union community pressure without some proof that the
group's actions were either authorized or ratified by the employer, thus
vacating the respondeat superior-esque justification the Board had
promulgated to that point. “The obvious effect” of this piece of the TaftHartley Act, as one commentator noted in reflection of the legislative
history, “was to make it much more difficult for the Board to control antiunion community pressures,”96 especially pivotal at the time of major
southern organizing efforts.97
2.

The Fine-Tuning of Laboratory Conditions to Measure
Community Pressure (1948–Present)

However, employers’ victory on this specific doctrinal front was
ultimately short-lived. In General Shoe, decided one year after the passage
of Taft-Hartley, the Board determined that it had the power to set aside
election results even in cases where neither party committed an unfair labor
practice.98 The majority’s opinion made no mention of limiting the
enforcement of its laboratory conditions doctrine to the employer or union
92

See, e.g., Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626 (1937) (holding that employer interfered
with employees’ organizing rights by instigating and organizing antiunion hostility, which
included warning citizens and public officials of perceived communal consequences of
unionization); see also Phillips, supra note 90, at 325 n.9.
93
See, e.g., Merit Clothing Co. 30 N.L.R.B. 1201 (1941) (finding that the anti-union
activities of the town mayor and other private citizens were directly traceable to the fear of
community citizens that the employer would close his plant if union activity continued);
see also Phillips, supra note 90, at 325 n.14.
94
See supra note 87.
95
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012)
(emphasis added); see also Phillips, supra note 90, at 328.
96
Phillips, supra note 90, at 328-29.
97
See Yeselson, supra note 23; Michael Goldfield, The Failure of Operation Dixie: A
Critical Turning Point in American Political Development?, in GARY M. FINK & EARL E.
REED, RACE, CLASS, AND COMMUNITY IN SOUTHERN LABOR HISTORY (1994).
98
See supra notes 78-85.
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(or agents of either party). As such, any misconduct that sufficiently
interfered with employees’ freedom of choice could taint the experiment
and require its repetition.
While the Board still held employers liable for violations of Section
8(a)(1) where it was found that anti-union third-parties were acting as
“agents” of an employer, and thus satisfied the stricter standard of the
revised Section 2(2),99 the Board applied the laboratory conditions doctrine
in cases where there was no agency relationship at all between the
transgressor and the company at issue.100 In James Lees & Sons Co.,101 for
example, the Board set aside an election where substantial anti-union
activity from the community created an “atmosphere of fear” at the plant
where workers were considering unionization,102 which, among other
things, included local banks refusing to make loans to known union
supporters. Importantly, the Board stated that it was immaterial whether the
employer was “responsible for the generation of the fear which interfered
with the free choice of ballot.”103 This atmosphere of fear concept was
thereafter frequently invoked in cases analyzing the extent of interference
arising from third-party activists.104
Around this time, the Board set aside elections where community
pressure upset laboratory conditions in the form of anti-union industrial
advisory committees,105 full-page newspaper advertisements warning of
economic harm,106 and letters and editorials that predicted plants would
leave town in the event of unionization.107 This also held true for public
officials that crusaded against union organizing efforts. In Utica-Herbrand
Tool Division of Kelsey-Hayes Co.,108 the Board invalidated an election
where officials and influential citizens of the community, through a
“barrage of propaganda” that included letters, visits to employees' homes,
99

See Phillips, supra note 90, at 330-38.
Id. at 341-44.
101
130 N.L.R.B. 290 (1961).
102
Id. at 291.
103
Id. at 299.
104
See Benson Veneer Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 781 (1966); Myrna Mills, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 767
(1961); Lake Catherine Footwear, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 443 (1961).
105
See Benson Veneer Co., 156 N.L.R.B. at 793-94; Proctor-Silex Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 598
(1966); Lifetime Door Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 13 (1966).
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See Monarch Rubber Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958).
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radio broadcasts, and newspaper editorials and advertisements, insisted that
unionization would force the employer to move its plant and bring
economic ruin upon the area.109 This aggressive campaigning from external
forces contributed to an “atmosphere of fear of reprisal and loss of job
opportunity if the employees selected the [union] as their bargaining agent”,
effectively destroying the “laboratory atmosphere which the Board seeks for
its elections.”110
The Board’s scrutiny of public officials eventually expanded in
stature, progressing from city councilmen and local business owners to
statewide officials and congressional figures. Notably, these individuals
often spoke in favor of unions. In Columbia Tanning Corp.,111 the Board set
aside an election where the Massachusetts state labor commissioner wrote a
letter in Greek to Greece-native employees one day before the election,
praising the union that was campaigning for certification and ultimately
endorsing its petition.112 The Board held that workers had been deprived of
a free choice in the election because many of the immigrant employees who
received the letter likely did not know the difference between the state and
federal labor boards, thus creating a perception that the “government” was
endorsing the union on the eve of the vote.113 This inquiry was relaxed for
more generic statements of solidarity. In Chipman Union, Inc.,114 the Board
denied an employer’s request to overturn an election in which a United
States Congresswoman wrote a one-page letter to employees voicing her
support for their “struggle for fairness and justice in the workplace.”115
Here, the Congresswoman’s statements could not be reasonably confused as
an official government endorsement a la Columbia Tanning, and “it was
clear that [she] was speaking only for herself and that her message
contained no threat or coercive statement whatsoever.”116 Similarly, in
Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc.,117 the majority held that a pro-union
109

Id. at 1726.
Id. at 1719, 1722.
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Id. at 900.
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Congressman’s relatively benign statement about workers’ disadvantages in
the context of federal labor law (contra employer’s advantages under the
NLRA) did not upset the laboratory conditions of the election to the point
that it necessitated setting aside the union’s victory.118
If one were to construct a standard emanating from this line of cases,
it appears that the Board is wary of assigning too much influence to public
officials’ statements unless there is a significant possibility that the intended
audience may confuse the speaker’s opinion for an official government
endorsement of one party to the election.119 Historically, however, the
Board is not hesitant to police those statements that are packaged as
economic threats, and it considers the cumulative effect of individual
incidents of third-party misconduct in evaluating the fairness of an
election.120 Each coercive action can potentially magnify the other,
118
Id. The Congressman’s words appeared in full in Chairman Hurtgen’s dissenting
opinion:
The Company has also refused to debate this important issue, claiming
that federal labor laws do not allow a fair debate because the laws restrict
what an employer can say. As a United States Congressman with a strong
interest in labor law, I can assure you that the law does indeed allow for a
fair debate. If the company chooses not to debate, that is their right, but
they should not hide behind misstatements about federal regulations. In
fact, the laws are structured in such a way as to make it extremely
difficult for workers to organize—not the other way around.
Id. (emphasis in original) (Hurtgen, Chairman, dissenting). Astoundingly, Chairman
Hurtgen would have held the Congressman’s statement per se coercive because of the level
of his office: “My view is simply that a Congressman should also stay away from that issue
in the context of pro-party comments in an ongoing organizational campaign.” Id. at 83.
The Chairman supplied no explanation for his contention that identical statements from the
workers’ employer would not be similarly coercive besides insisting that “[a]s to matters of
law, employees are likely to view the response of a Federal official as more reliable than
that of a private party to the election.” Id.
119
For additional examples, see Affiliated Computer Servs., 355 N.L.R.B. 899, 900-901
(2010) (during which State Senator’s expressed concern that employer’s proposed
compensation plan “may result in layoffs in our state and in the borough that I represent”
could not reasonably be construed as coercive upon employees or as a “veiled threat” to
employer); Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino, 352 N.L.R.B. 628, 629 (2008) (determining that
statements from three state and federal elected officials asserting that they had examined
signed authorization cards and concluded a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit had authorized the union to represent them was not coercive and would be interpreted
as a mere expressions of opinion).
120
See Picoma Industries, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 498, 498 (1989) (stressing the need to
“consider the cumulative credited evidence in determining the effect of third-party
preelection misconduct” on election results); see also Universal Mfg. Corp., 156 N.L.R.B.
1459 (1966) (finding that coordinated anti-union actions by members of the community
violated laboratory conditions of the election).
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snowballing the stress and tension of the campaign until they create the
atmosphere of fear that settles upon workers’ cities, neighborhoods, and
homes—hence community pressure.
III. TAKING THE EXPERIMENT SERIOUSLY: ADAPTING THE LABORATORY
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE TO CURB ANTI-UNION COMMUNITY PRESSURE
Those cognizant of this extra layer of prophylactic enforcement
invoked it following the UAW’s loss in Chattanooga. In the days between
the election and the union filing charges with the Board, labor law scholar
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt argued that “[i]f in fact [Senator Corker] made
fraudulent statements with the intent of intimidating workers, that would be
a violation of laboratory conditions.”121 The falsity of Corker’s claims—that
Volkswagen would expand production at Chattanooga only if its workforce
voted against unionization—is almost a certainty. The company
immediately disavowed the Senator’s comments,122 and while the
Chattanooga plant was eventually awarded the SUV production line Corker
spoke of, the announcement came several months after the fallout of the
election results,123 whereas Corker promised such an announcement would
come within weeks of the union’s loss. Moreover, documents obtained by
Tennessee journalists after the election revealed that the offices of Corker
and Governor Haslam coordinated anti-UAW messaging with various state
Republicans and anti-union organizations leading up to the vote, unveiling a
far more collaborative mobilization against the union effort than any
individual had suggested transpired.124 Most damning was Haslam’s
121

Moshe Z. Marvit, What Are the UAW’s Legal Options After the Volkswagen Defeat?, IN
THESE TIMES (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:14 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/16306
/uaw_legal_options_volkswagen_defeat.
122
Silvia, supra note 31, at 14 (“[Volkswagen] CEO [Frank] Fischer released a response,
asserting that there was ‘no connection between our Chattanooga employees’ decision
about whether to be represented by a union and the decision about where to build a new
product for the US market’”).
123
See Aaron M. Kessler, Volkswagen to Add S.U.V. Line to Chattanooga Plant, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/business/vw-to-add-suvproduction-to-chattanooga-plant.html?mtrref=www.google.com. The company announced
in April 2017 that it was adding yet another SUV line to its Chattanooga plant. David
Shepardson, Volkswagen to Build New SUV in Tennessee Plant, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2017,
9:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autoshow-new-york-vw/volkswagen-tobuild-new-suv-in-tennessee-plant-idUSKBN17E1UB.
124
See Mike Elk, Emails Show Sen. Corker’s Chief of Staff Coordinated with Network of
Anti-UAW Union Busters, IN THESE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014, 11:05 PM),
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/16505/emails_show_bob_corkers_chief_of_staff_co
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retraction of a $300 million offer in economic incentives to Volkswagen
that was contingent on the company actively opposing the UAW’s
organizing efforts.125
True to Dau-Schmidt’s prediction, the UAW filed objections to the
election results on the basis of third-party misconduct.126 The union’s
objection asserted that threats were “made by powerful political leaders
who, in fact and in the reasonable perception of the employees, were quite
capable of putting their threat into effect.”127 These politicians—aided by
private interest groups—repeatedly threatened the “diminishment of job
security if the workers vote for the union” until their message “was known
to every potential voter in this extremely high visibility campaign.”128
While the UAW eventually withdrew its charges to facilitate other
organizing attempts at the Chattanooga plant,129 thus relinquishing its right
to litigate the issue before a favorable, Obama-stocked Board,130 the theory
raised in the objections is ripe for review by future Boards. As recent events
in Mississippi demonstrated, the community pressure encountered at
Volkswagen was not unique; both pro- and anti-union forces alike
recognize that each foreign automaker plant in the region may represent a
strategic stronghold for the future solvency of organized labor. As a simple
ordinated_with_anti_uaw_groups; John Logan, Evidence of GOP Interference in VW
Election Is Now Overwhelming, TRUTHOUT (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/23007-evidence-of-gop-interference-in-vw-election-is-nowoverwhelming.
125
Phil Williams, Haslam Offers No Apologies For $300M Volkswagen Offer, NEWS
CHANNEL 5, http://www.newschannel5.com/story/25135576/haslam-offers-no-apologiesfor-300m-volkswagen-offer. The incentives—comprised of taxpayer money—were
“subject to works council discussions . . . being concluded to the satisfaction of the State of
Tennessee.” Id.; see also Michael Ballaban, Tennessee Governor Leveled A $300 Million
Threat At VW Over UAW Vote, JALOPNIK (Apr. 1, 2014, 1:20 PM),
https://jalopnik.com/tennessee-governor-leveled-a-300-million-threat-at-vw-1556229931;
Alexander Stoklosa, Documents Back Up UAW Claim of “Political Interference” in VW
Chattanooga
Vote,
CAR AND
DRIVER
(Apr.
2,
2014,
3:05
PM),
https://blog.caranddriver.com/documents-back-up-uaw-claim-of-political-interference-invw-chattanooga-vote/.
126
UAW Objections, supra note 54, at 10-12.
127
Id. at 11.
128
Id. at 9, 11.
129
See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
130
Assuming that the Board would have rendered a final decision in the Volkswagen case
within 41 months of the UAW’s initial filing, any expansion of the laboratory conditions
doctrine would have been in place by the time the UAW petitioned for a representation
election at Nissan’s Mississippi plant in July 2017.
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matter of logistics, unions must organize the American South to both
expand membership and protect contractual gains made in more laborfriendly states.131 Large-scale organizing campaigns in traditionally antiunion areas of the country will continue to occur in the coming years, and it
is imperative that the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the
NLRA’s twin protections of industrial peace and employees’ freedom of
choice132 adapt its machinery to shield elections from coercive third-party
conduct. Interference by anti-union politicians, business groups, and private
interests are only incentivized by further dormancy.
A.

Applying Extant Case Law to the UAW’s Roadblocks

Appropriately, the crux of the UAW’s legal argument relied upon
Westwood Horizons Hotel;133 the Board’s current standard for determining
whether third-party misconduct created “a general atmosphere of fear and
reprisal rendering a free election impossible.”134 Here, the Board would
apply a five-factor test to the various statements made during the elections
at Nissan or Volkswagen by considering:
(1) the nature of the threat itself;
(2) whether it encompassed the entire [bargaining] unit;
(3) the extent of dissemination;

131

The case of the Machinists union and Boeing is demonstrative. See supra note 75.
Boeing built its newest plant in South Carolina, home of the lowest union density in the
country, see Union Density, supra note 22, explicitly in reaction to the frequent labor
disputes the company experienced at its plant in Seattle. Andrew Strom, Boeing and the
NLRB—A Sixty-Four Year-Old Time Bomb Explodes, 68 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 109
(2011). The company has since laid off thousands of workers in the state of Washington.
Dominic Gates, Boeing plans hundreds of layoff notices for engineers this week, SEATTLE
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017, 11:47 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeingaerospace/boeing-plans-hundreds-of-layoffs-for-engineers-this-week/ (“Boeing cut almost
7,400 jobs in the state” in 2016 alone). By any reasonable estimation, the Machinists union
must organize Boeing’s only non-union plant to prevent the further siphoning of jobs and
production assignments from its union shops. See It’s Not Over, supra note 74 (“[L]ike the
[UAW] at [Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors], the Machinists union has only one option
for protecting its gains and winning back what it has lost: it must organize in the South.”).
132
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). For an example
of the Supreme Court’s invocation of these principles, see Fall River Dyeing and Finishing
Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38 (1987).
133
270 N.L.R.B. 802 (1984); see also UAW Objections, supra note 54, at 11.
134
Westwood Horizons, 270 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 (1984).
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(4) whether the person making the threat was capable of carrying it out,
and whether it is likely that employees acted in fear of that
capability; and
(5) whether the threat was made or revived at or near the time of the
election.135
The community pressure directed at the UAW in both campaigns
undoubtedly clears Westwood Horizon’s hurdles. First, most threats were
predicated on the potential loss of jobs for the employees at Nissan and
Volkswagen, often explicitly referencing the layoffs and economic
recession suffered in the union’s headquarters of Detroit. Corker’s coercion
hit from the opposite end, promising additional jobs and a plant expansion if
Volkswagen’s workers voted against the UAW. Combined, such warnings
and assurances—which are automatic unfair labor practices if mentioned by
an employer—invoke Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s famous quip that
“[t]he danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion
of a fist inside the velvet glove.”136
Second, these anti-union statements were exclusively directed at the
entire rank-and-file workforces of both plants. Whether threatening job
losses or promising job security, both tactics were designed to appeal to as
many employees as possible so as to harm the union’s position on the shop
floor and in the community. This factor is typically applied in cases where
threats are made to an individual or a small number of employees within
larger bargaining units,137 but here there was no such specificity.
Third, the statements were widely disseminated through extensive
media coverage. The UAW’s objections documented the flood of media
attention paid specifically to Corker’s assurances,138 and noted that “the
‘No2UAW’ Facebook page, a center of debate on the campaign, placed
beyond doubt how the Corker threats were to be read by the [Volkswagen]
workforce” by frequently linking to media reports of his statements.139
Nissan workers such as Robert Hathorn described a general feeling of
135

Lamar Advertising of Janesville, 340 N.L.R.B. 979, 980 (2003) (citing Westwood
Horizons, 270 N.L.R.B. at 803).
136
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 410 (1964).
137
See, e.g., MasTec Direct TV, 356 N.L.R.B. 809, 811-12 (2011) (finding pro-union
employee’s physical threat to four co-workers did not create a general atmosphere of fear
and reprisal in part because employee’s threats did not encompass the entire unit).
138
UAW Objections, supra note 54, at 14-58.
139
See id. at 12, 57-58.
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exhaustion and inundation from the anti-union organizations’ messaging in
Mississippi.140
The fourth factor requires the most speculation without Boardconducted hearings and employee testimony, but it seems self-evident that
Volkswagen employees would consider the combined forces of the state’s
legislature, governor, and a United States senator to be capable of making
good on their threats of withholding tax subsidies or promises of added
production.141 Nissan employees in Mississippi, while only subjected to
Facebook posts and general anti-union sentiments from their governor,142
were nonetheless tasked with weighing the words of a unified local business
scene that constantly warned of the perils of unionization. It cannot be said
for certain whether a critical mass of employees based their vote on this
community pressure, but the purpose of powerful people’s issuing strong
statements is assumedly to exert influence in achieving their desired result.
Finally, the timing of these statements in both elections was clearly
intended to maximize their impact. Governor Bryant vocalized his Detroitthemed warning the day before the vote at Nissan, while Corker held a press
conference on the first day of voting. Other anti-union statements, posts,
and materials were increasingly disseminated in the days leading up to the
election,143 mirroring the usual campaign behavior of Board-officiated

140

See supra notes 1, 75 and accompany text.
Corker, after all, has often claimed responsibility for recruiting Volkswagen to
Chattanooga as the city’s former mayor. See Lydia DePillis, Sen. Bob Corker Can’t Stand
the United Auto Workers: An Annotated Interview, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/02/12/sen-bob-corker-cant-standthe-united-auto-workers-an-annotated-interview/?utm_term=.d33059686873
(“I’m
a
former mayor of Chattanooga. I recruited [Volkswagen] to our state. I was the first person
to call their number, and two of the three meetings with them took place in my home in
Chattanooga. I know [VW Chairman Martin] Winterkorn really really [sic] well. We’re in
constant contact with Volkswagen at every level. Seriously, I don’t know a public official
that’s been more involved with Volkswagen, nor, candidly, more involved with the
UAW.”).
142
See supra note 71 and accompanying text; Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi Governor:
Nissan Workers Should Reject Union, U.S. NEWS (July 27, 2017, 5:01 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/mississippi/articles/2017-07-27/governor-housespeaker-stumping-at-neshoba-county-fair.
143
See Silvia, supra note 31, at 12-15; Dave Jamieson, Nissan Launches Anti-Union Blitz
Ahead of Pivotal UAW Election, HUFFINGTON POST (July 30, 2017, 5:53 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nissan-launches-anti-union-blitz-ahead-of-pivotalelection-in-the-south_us_597e11d0e4b02a8434b7019d.
141
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elections in which employers are actively contesting the petitioning
union.144
In sum, it appears likely that a labor-sympathetic Board would
consider massive, politically-coordinated third-party misconduct as creating
a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal that made a free election
impossible for the workers at Nissan and Volkswagen, especially where
past Board decisions involving community pressure frequently invalidated
elections on the basis of anti-union newspaper editorials, advertisements,
and actions of local businessmen or city officials.145 The events that
recently transpired in Mississippi and Tennessee certainly seem as coercive
as those that took place in the middle of the twentieth century between
unions and hostile, small-town communities, if not more so.
One potential counterargument arises from these cases with regard
to Volkswagen. In the first decades of the laboratory conditions doctrine’s
formulation, the Board would often refuse to set aside representation
elections in borderline cases of community pressure where it was found that
the employer publicly and privately disavowed rumors of plant closings or
other forms of job losses.146 Thus, Volkswagen could have defended the
results of the election on the basis that it disputed Corker’s statements and
urged other third parties not to involve itself in the campaign.147
However, the specific facts of the election at Volkswagen
demonstrate the logical futility of grafting such a defense onto the actions of
Corker and other anti-union actors. While Volkswagen officials denied that
any plant expansion was contingent on the outcome of the election, it is not
the company that was to be feared. Republicans leaders of the Tennessee
legislature had already publicly threatened to withhold tax subsidies from
the company if its workers voted to unionize. Indeed, the very reason why
Volkswagen resisted the UAW’s call for card-check recognition as early as
the summer of 2013 was because management feared upsetting Republican
politicians in Tennessee.148 And if nothing else, Nissan’s aggressive
campaign against the union in Mississippi—in addition to the alleged anti-

144

Bronfenbrenner, supra note 6, at 20-24.
See supra Part II.B.ii.
146
See Phillips, supra note 91, at 344-45.
147
Silvia, supra note 31, at 14.
148
Silvia, supra note 31, at 9 (“[Volkswagen] management refused the request because
they were ‘concerned about antagonizing Republican politicians in Tennessee.’”).
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union behavior of other automakers across the country149—dampers any
expectation that Volkswagen’s neutrality agreement with the UAW may
become an industry norm.
B.

Confronting “Both Sides”-ism and its Absurdities

Bolstering the laboratory conditions doctrine to combat anti-union
community pressure invites an obvious criticism. In cases such as Chipman
and Saint-Gobain, the Board declined to set aside elections in which
members of Congress expressed support for employees’ organizing
efforts;150 despite the fact that the politicians addressed the employees
directly in writing and assured them of their right to join a union. If the
Board were to find misconduct in the actions of politicians, business groups,
and private interests that aggressively oppose unionization, those same
parties may argue that pro-union statements by politicians should also be
considered sufficiently disruptive of laboratory conditions. As attorneys of
the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation have argued, “Even
Obama weighed in with support for unionization at Volkswagen”151, and
Senator Bernie Sanders fervently campaigned for the UAW in
Mississippi.152
That logic relies on a longstanding flaw in American labor law that
has existed since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act: that persuasion from a
union is the same as persuasion from an employer. This yin-and-yang view
of industrial relations defies basic understandings of human psychology and
behavioral economics. As psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky have demonstrated since the 1980s, people tend to prefer avoiding
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See, e.g., David Welch, UAW Files Claim That Tesla Fired Workers Who Supported
Union, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2017, 11:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2017-10-26/uaw-files-claim-that-tesla-fired-workers-who-supported-union.
150
See supra notes 114-18.
151
Ben Penn, UAW Files Objections Over VW Election With NLRB, Allqweeges ThirdParty Coercion, B.N.A. (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.bna.com/uaw-files-objectionsn17179882349/.
152
Right to Work (@RightToWork), TWITTER (Nov. 17, 2017, 3:03 PM),
https://twitter.com/RightToWork/status/931613794106781696; see also John Nichols,
Bernie Sanders Is Going to Mississippi to March With Workers This Weekend, NATION
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/bernie-sanders-is-going-to-mississippito-march-with-workers-this-weekend/; Bernie Sanders, Nissan dispute could go down as
most vicious anti-union crusade in decades, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2017, 6:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/03/nissan-workers-union-bernie-sanders.

2020

GRAND THEFT AUTO

129

losses to acquiring equivalent gains.153 This phenomenon, generally referred
to as “loss aversion,” bears out strikingly well across all sorts of decisional
avenues,154 but it features most prominently in monetary considerations.
Some studies estimate that individuals tend to give economic losses
approximately two-fold the weight that they assign gains.155
Union representation elections fit neatly into this theory: the
decision to vote for or against unionization produces a similar (if implicit)
economic analysis among employees in the bargaining unit. Unionizing
alters the status quo of the workplace,156 and its advertised advantages will
inevitably be blunted by vocalized opposition from the entities who control
workers’ benefits, paychecks, and schedules. This resistance increasingly
takes the form of subtle threats or warnings from management and company
supervisors, spreading concern that a union victory may result in the loss of
existing wages and benefits, jobs, or even the closing of the plant entirely
should the union win certification.157 The best anti-union campaigns make
the two concepts synonymous.
The union is the carrot; a threat to job security is the stick. In a
world where workers may be twice as afraid of the beating as they are
hungry for the treat, it is a work of legal fiction to police both pro-union and
anti-union forces alike as if their words carry the same weight when
uttered.158 With recent events in mind, future Board members should hold
anti-union community pressure to greater scrutiny than pro-union actions—
153

See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 334-41 (2011); DANIEL
KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 341-50 (1984).
154
See Sang Lee et al., The Commonality of Loss Aversion across Procedures and Stimuli,
PLOS ONE (Sept. 22, 2015), available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article
/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0135216&type=printable.
155
Id. at 1.
156
Daniel Kahneman and others have observed the loss aversion theory’s utility in the
context of status quo bias. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 193, 197-203 (1991). See also Becker, supra note 86, at 567-68.
157
See generally Bronfenbrenner, supra note 6.
158
More to this point, non-union employers enjoy the equivalent of despotic power over
their workforces. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW
EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017). Meanwhile,
unions have not possessed the authority to compel the discharge of employees for purposes
other than their failure to pay the equivalent of membership dues and initiation fees since
1947. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (Taft-Hartley modifications to
Section 8(a)(3) effectively banned the closed shop and whittled down union-shop
membership to “financial core” status).
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and it should do so until the latter proves itself to be the former’s equal in
disrupting the laboratory conditions of Board-officiated elections. Anything
less will contribute to the widening disparity of economic power between
capital and labor that defines our twenty-first century reality of corporate
mobility, neoliberal governance, and increasingly feeble labor laws.
C.

The Utility of the Doctrine in the Information Age

There is something to say about the appropriateness of re-enforcing
a legal maxim that is nearing its seventieth birthday in coverage of rapidly
changing industries. Multiple criticisms can be made against its extension
from even a pro-union standpoint. First, the need for “laboratory
conditions” rests upon an analogy that champions neutrality where
government impartiality may ultimately mean extinction for organized
labor.159 Second, the doctrine favors NLRB election machinery in an era
that has proven that anything but card-check recognition inherently favors
management and supposes that the election process itself is a system of
industrial governance worth saving.160 Third, and perhaps most operational,
a doctrine predicated on censoring opinions and withholding information
from voters is futile in an era where opinions and information are
increasingly accessible.161
While infringements such as Corker’s assurances seem eminently
punishable, more subtle statements of labor-management viewpoints may
be impossible to police but remain just as effective. Furthermore,
organizing communications increasingly take place online and not in
traditional media, incentivizing the swift flow of information at critical
points in the campaign. The remedy for a violation of laboratory
conditions—a redo of the election—seemingly dooms unions to a cycle of
fighting foes it cannot stop with weapons it cannot match.
These are valid assessments, and they suggest that Board law needs
a serious overhaul in more ways than one. But this analysis does not purport
to be anything more than a fine-tuning of an existing doctrine to produce
159

See supra Part III.B.
See generally Becker, supra note 86 (arguing that management has no legitimate
interest in workers’ decision to unionize); Ezra Klein, How Bad is Card Check?, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 20, 2006), http://prospect.org/article/how-bad-card-check.
161
See generally Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Limiting Information in the Information Age:
The NLRB’s Misguided Attempt to Squelch Employer Speech, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 473
(2013).
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more equitable outcomes from the resources that are already available.
While unions should be actively searching for ways to alter a playing field
that has refused to fight fair for decades, labor must fire its loaded guns.
CONCLUSION
Although this article has been sympathetic to the UAW’s plight (as
well as that of other labor organizations braving the Southern Cage), it does
not mean to minimize the union’s campaign missteps. There is much to be
said about the self-immolating nature of the UAW’s cherished neutrality
agreement with Volkswagen, which left at least some workers wondering
what they were fighting for by draining the union of its adversarial
element,162 and its campaign at Nissan was rife with criticism of basic
strategic blunders.163 Certainly at least some blame must be placed upon the
leadership of today’s largest manufacturing-based unions, who—in the face
of globalization and an increasingly hostile political climate—have pushed
collaboration with corporations and accepted concessions on contracts.164
However, it is not clear that the UAW’s tactical shortcomings robbed it of
sure victories at Nissan or Volkswagen, and it does not follow that more
militant unionism would have won the day at either plant.
The problem for unions remains the same regardless of their
posture: labor wishes to extract more value from the goods and services it
produces, and capital will oppose additional labor costs to maintain its share
of profits. Given this diametric conflict in economic order, perhaps it is
pointless to advocate for tweaks to doctrines of small subsets of American
labor law; it may be futile to make any doctrinal changes at all to the laws
as they currently exist. If so, it is better to wait for major legislative reforms
that fundamentally alter the ways in which unions organize or collectively
162

See Silvia, supra note 31, at 16; Mike Elk, How Sweetheart Deals Hurt Labor,
COMMON DREAMS (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/02/18
/how-sweetheart-deals-hurt-labor; Wayne Cliett, Why Do Auto Workers Union Drives Keep
Failing? A Rank-and-File View, LABOR NOTES (Jan. 10, 2018), http://labornotes.org/blogs/
2018/01/why-do-auto-workers-union-drives-keep-failing-rank-and-file-view?language=es.
163
The major targets of criticism were the UAW’s rank-and-file organizing committee,
which was allegedly understaffed and unrepresentative of the plant as a whole, and the
union’s decision to call for a vote while lacking the desired supermajority of authorization
cards from members in the bargaining unit. See Brooks & Bruskin, supra note 67.
164
See Sam Gindin, Lessons from Chattanooga, JACOBIN (Feb. 24, 2014),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/02/lessons-from-chattanooga/; Dianne Feeley, Against
the New Normal, JACOBIN (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/uawautoworkers-contracts-ford-chrysler-gm-fiat-marchionne/.
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bargain with employers. Unions would thus be better served waiting for
national card-check legislation,165 industry-wide bargaining rights,166 or
perhaps even a comprehensive successor to the National Labor Relations
Act.167
But this argument puts the cart before the horse. It assumes that a
critical mass of legislators will eventually decide to spend time, resources,
and political capital reforming labor law and championing unions, even
though the post-Reagan labor movement is bereft of major organizing
victories that could serve as a symbol of resurgence.168 People who are not
in unions need a reason to care about unions, and it is difficult to
communicate the benefits of collective bargaining rights when seemingly
the only times unions appear in national media is through coverage of major
defeats in organizing drives169 or through passage of state Right-to-Work
laws.

165

Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); accord Brent
Garren & Zachary Henige, The Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”): Salvaging Sec. 7
Rights, A.B.A., available at https://apps.americanbar.org/labor/annualconference/2007/
materials/data/papers/v2/019.pdf.
166
Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 2 (2016); accord Dylan Matthews,
Europe could have the secret to saving America’s unions, VOX (Apr. 17, 2017, 9:30 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/17/15290674/union-labor-movementeurope-bargaining-fight-15-ghent.
167
Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2019, H.R. 2474, 116th Congress (2019);
accord Alexia Fernández Campbell, Democrats Have an Ambitious Plan to Save American
Labor Unions, VOX (May 14, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/
5/14/18536789/right-to-work-unions-protecting-the-right-to-organize-act-bill.
168
This is perhaps a symptom of the national media and political establishment’s
overrepresentation of the manufacturing industry as the face of “blue-collar” work. See Ben
Casselman, Americans Don’t Miss Manufacturing—They Miss Unions, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(May 13, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-dont-missmanufacturing-they-miss-unions/. This portrayal effectively minimizes the achievements of
females and African-Americans, who are the fastest growing demographic in unionization.
Anna Louie Sussman, Are Women the New Face of Organized Labor?, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
7, 2015, 8:08 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/09/07/are-women-the-new-faceof-organized-labor/; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2016, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, available at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (showing that “Black
workers were more likely to be union members [in 2016] than were White, Asian, or
Hispanic workers”).
169
National media have a penchant for describing most union elections they bother
covering as “historic.” See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, Auto union loses historic election at
Volkswagen
plant
in
Tennessee,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
14,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/02/14/united-auto-workers-losehistoric-election-at-chattanooga-volkswagen-plant/?utm_term=.b17642fbe422. It is hard to
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As its ranks continue to dwindle, the labor movement needs a spark,
a rallying point, a triumph. It must organize a world-famous employer, and
it must do so in the South. This article demonstrated that it is unlikely
unions will be able to claim such a victory until the National Labor
Relations Board rules that aggressive, anti-union community pressure is a
violation of the laboratory conditions doctrine espoused over seventy years
ago in General Shoe. The tactics deployed by anti-union politicians,
business groups, and private interests in the elections at Nissan’s and
Volkswagen’s plants undeniably created an atmosphere that rendered free
choice impossible for the employees involved, and such parties are
encouraged to utilize the same strategy at the next major battles for foreign
manufacturers’ workplaces until labor law holds them accountable.

see what made this election more historic than, say, the same union’s organizing effort at
Nissan’s Smyrna, Tennessee plant in the late 1980s.

